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RECENT CASES
HABEAS CORPUS-RESTRAINT IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW-FEDERAL
COLLATERAL RELIEF NOT AVAILABLE FOR STATE PRISONERS WHO HAVE
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FAIR LITIGATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT CLAIMS IN STATE COURTS.
Two state prisoners, Lloyd Powell in California,' and David Rice
in Nebraska, 2 had been convicted of criminal offenses and their con-
victions had been affirmed in their respective state appellate courts.0
Both prisoners sought federal habeas corpus relief4 contending that
their convictions were based, at least in part, upon the introduction
of evidence at their trials which had been obtained in violation of
their rights under the fourth amendment 5 to the United States Con-
1. Lloyd Powell was arrested in Henderson, Nevada, for violation of a municipal va-
grancy ordinance. The arresting officer had discovered, in a search of Powell, a .38 cali-
ber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. Powell was extradited to Cali-
fornia to stand trial for the murder of a liquor store manager's wife that had occurred
during an altercation with the store manager over the theft of a bottle of wine. Powell
contended that his arrest was illegal, since the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague according to the decision in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972),
and therefore the testimony of the arresting officer regarding the search and discovery of
the revolver should have been excluded because it was obtained in violation of his rights
under the fourth amendment. The trial court rejected Powell's contention and convicted
Powell of murder. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and
found it necessary to pass on the legality of the arrest and search because it concluded
that the error, if any, in admitting the testimony was "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt", citing the decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Supreme
Court of California denied Powell's petition for habeas corpus relief. Stone v. Powell, 96
S. Ct. 3037, 3039-40 (1976).
2. David Rice and an accomplice had been involved in a bombing plot in which a po-
lice officer was killed. A warrant was obtained to search Rice's apartment. The police dis-
covered dynamite and other explosive materials in the search. A chemical analysis of
Rice's clothing also disclosed dynamite particles. Rice contended that the evidence obtained
had been discovered as the result of an illegal search of his home. He alleged that the
search warrant was invalid because the supporting affidavit was defective. The trial court
rejected Rice's contention and convicted Rice of murder. The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, holding that the search warrant was valid. Id. at 3040-41.
3. Id. at 3039.
4. The federal habeas corpus statute for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), pro-
vides, in part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ur treaties of
the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus is behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State cor-
rective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process inef-
fective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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stitution.e In Powell's case, a California federal district court denied
habeas corpus relief but was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.- In Rice's case, a Nebraska federal district court order
which had granted habeas corpus relief was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The wardens of the penal institutions in
which the prisoners were incarcerated were granted certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court.9 The Supreme Court reversed the
decisions of both circuit courts and held that a state prisoner would
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief where the state had pro-
vided for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment claim that
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure was
introduced at his trial.1o The Court further found that the exclusion-
ary rule, which prohibits- the admission of evidence obtained through
an unconstitutional search and seizure," contributes only minimally
to the effectuation of fourth amendment guarantees when applied in
a collateral habeas corpus proceeding. 1 2 Stone v. Powell, - U.S.- ,
96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
The federal courts were given the authority to issue the writ of
habeas corpus13 in the initial grant of jurisdiction to the federal
6. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3039 (1976).
7. Id. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 99 (9th Cir. 1974).
8. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1974). The
Nebraska federal district court had concluded that the search warrant was Invalid because
the supporting affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to give the magistrate probable
cause to Issue the warrant under the tests set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-94 (1974).
The court also found that the evidence of dynamite particles found on Rice's clothing should
have been suppressed, since it was the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would have
not been issued but for the prior unlawful search of his home. 388 F. Supp. 185, 202-07.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 3S5 (1920).
9. Stone v. Powell, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975). The Court requested, in addition to the ques-
tions presented by the petition for certiorari, that counsel for Powell brief and argue the
following question:
Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that the Hender-
son, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest respondent for violation
of an ordinance which at the time of the arrest had not been authoritatively
determined to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered
as a result of a search Incident in that arrest violated his rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution Is one
cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 1055.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Stone v. Powell, the question of
the unconstitutional vagueness of the Henderson, Nevada ordinance was not discussed In
the opinion of the Court. 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3069 (1976).
In Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), the Court requested that this additional
question be briefed:
Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of respondent's
premises by Omaha police officers under the circumstances of this case is a
question properly cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 1055-56.
10. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976).
11. The exclusionary rule was first enunciated in Weeks v. United. States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
12. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 30.2 (1976). Justice Brennan, In a strong dissent, argued that the
Court had reached its conclusion without expressly overruling any of its prior decisions
regarding the scope and function of habeas corpus relief, id. at 3058, and further, that
the Court had rewritten Jurisdictional statutes, a power committed solely to Congress.
d. at 3065.
13. "[T]he phrase 'habeas corpus' used alone refers to the common law writ of habeas
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courts. 14 The writ originally extended only to prisoners held in cus-
tody by the federal government. 5 In 1867, the writ was extended
to state prisoners. 6
The substantive scope of the writ of habeas corpus was not de-
fined in the First Judiciary Act,'17 but the Court has gradually ex-
panded it since 1867.11 In Frank v. Magnum, 9 the Court held that a
federal court upon a habeas corpus application could inquire into the
merits of a federal claim if a sthate failed to provide adequate "cor-
rective process," and that the inquiry need not be limited to the jur-
isdiction of the sentencing court. 20 The Court found, however, that
the state involved had provided for adequate "corrective process,"
following trial in the state court, by adopting the
procedure of a motion for a new trial followed by an appeal
to its Supreme Court, not confined to the mere record of
conviction but going at large, ... into the question whether
the processes of justice have been interfered with in the trial
court.
2 1
The Court held in Brown v. Allen22 that a prisoner could be en-
titled to full reconsideration of his federal claims, which had been
rejected in the state court, despite adequate state corrective process.
This could include, when appropriate, a hearing in federal district
court. 23 However, habeas corpus review would be denied where the
corpus ad subjiciendun, known as the 'Great Writ'." Ex -parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1907).
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is defined as:
A writ directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner, (or person detained,) with the day and
cause of his caption and detention . . . to do, submit to, and receive what-
soever the judge or court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 837 (4th ed. 1968).
14. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
15. Id.
16. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
17. In Stone v. Powell the majority found that the scope of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction for both state and federal applicants, as initially defined by the courts, was
limited to consideration of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3042
(1976). Justice Brennan, in dissent, termed the majority's interpretation a "revisionist his-
tory." Id. at 3062. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, had attempted to refute this narrow view of the scope of habeas corpus. In Pay
he asserted that the scope of habeas corpus has remained constant, although standards of
due process have evolved, and that, "History refutes the notion that until recently the
writ was available only in a very narrow class of lawless imprisonments." Id. at 402-03.
18. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus,
64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966) Comment, Availability of Federal Post-Conviction Relief in
Light of a Subsequent Change in Law, 66 J. CRIM. L. 117 (1975).
For an analysis of Bator's article, see Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas
Corpus Survive the Floodt 6 CuM. L. REv. 363, 376-80 (1975).
19. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
20. Id. at 333-35.
21. Id. at 335.
22. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
23. Id. at 463-64. The Court stated that, "a trial may be had in the discretion of the
Federal court or judge .. " Id. at 463. However, no trial would be required where the
federal court could adequately we'gh the sufficiency of the evidence from the record.
Id.
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prisoner had failed to comply with legitimate state procedural rules
for appeal of a conviction.
2 '
This procedural barrier was removed in Fay v. Noia,25 where
the prisoner was granted federal habeas corpus review despite his
failure to appeal the state conviction.2 The Court held:
[F]ederal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation
of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by any-
thing that may occur in the state court proceedings. State
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal
policy. 27
In Kaufman v. United States,28 the Court held that federal col-
lateral review was available to federal prisoners who alleged that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence had been admitted against them
at trial. 29 Although the issue was the scope of the post-conviction
relief statute for federal prisoners, 3 the discussion centered on the
requirement of granting habeas corpus relief when a defendant
has been convicted in a state court on the basis of evidence obtained
in an illegal search or seizure, contrary to the exclusionary rule. 1
The Court reasoned that since state prisoners had been accorded fed-
eral habeas corpus relief under these circumstances, federal prison-
ers should have the same relief. 32 The substantive scope of the writ
of habeas corpus had thus grown to allow broad collateral re-examin-
ation of both state and federal convictions.
The need for broad habeas corpus relief has been recognized by
the Court as an additional safeguard against "intolerable restraints"
of those who have been "grievously wronged" by society. 33 However,
the availability of broad habeas corpus review for purposes other
than to protect the innocent has been criticized. 4 In particular, the
irrelevance of the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment to the reliability of trial as a truth-finding pro-
cess 35 has been noted as a reason for withdrawing claims based on
the exclusionary rule from broad collateral habeas corpus relief. 8
24. Id. at 486.
25. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
26. Id. at 391.
27. Id. at 426-27.
28. 894 U.S. 217 (1969). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court.
29. Id. at 231.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
31. 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969).
32. Id. at 226.
33. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
94. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
35. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 399, 414 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
36. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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The exclusionary rule of evidence was created by the judiciary
to effectuate the fundamental constitutional guarantees of the fourth
amendment. 7 The common law rule had been that the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the means in which it had been ob-
tained .8
The Supreme Court first suggested in Boyd v. United States9
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment should
be inadmissible at trial.4 0 In Weeks v. United States4 1 the Court
enunciated the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence seized dur-
ing an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the defen-
dant in a federal criminal prosecution.
42
The exclusionary rule was extended to state criminal prosecu-
tions in Mapp v. Ohio.4 3 The Court held that the fourth amendment
was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and
therefore all state courts were required to exclude any evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment.
44
The justification primarily advanced for application of the ex-
clusionary rule has been the presumed deterrence of future unlawful
police conduct.4 5 This justification was recognized in Elkins v. United
States,46 where the Court stated:
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose
is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incen-
tive to disregard it.
4 7
The substantive scope of habeas corpus and the scope of the ex-
clusionary rule were reconsidered and discussed in Stone v. Powell.4
8
First, the Court recognized the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
37. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046 (1976).
38. 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2183 (MeNaughton rev. 1961).
39. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40. Id. at 616. The Court held that the compulsory production of private books and
papers by the owner of goods in a customs revenue suit, to be used as evidence against
him at trial, was, in effect, compelling the owner to be a witness against himself, con-
trary to the fifth amendment to the Constitution. The Court equated this compulsory pro-
duction of evidence with an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 635.
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42. Id. at 398.
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Id. at 654-55. Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), where the
Court had concluded that although the fourth amendment was incorporated by the four-
teenth amendment, state courts were not required to exclude any evidence that may have
been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 27-28.
45. See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alter-
natives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621. But see Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255:
A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. (1964) ; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970).
46. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
47. Id. at 217. This rationale has been repeated by the Court in several decisions sub-
sequent to Elkins. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 3051 (1976) ; United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
48. 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
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rule, but stated: "[Dlespite the broad deterrent purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to prescribe the intro-
duction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons."
49
The Court then turned to the central question of whether a state
prisoner, who has had an opportunity to litigate his fourth amend-
ment claim in the state court,. could invoke this claim again on fed-
eral habeas corpus review.50 The Court engaged in an interest balanc-
ing process and stated: "The answer is to be found by weighing the
utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to
collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.' '3 1 The Court endor-
sed the exclusionary rule in its existing form 52 but reasoned that
while there might be an incremental increase in the furtherance of
the deterrent effect of the exclusonary rule in collateral habeas cor-
pus proceedings, the "costs" to society of its application outweighed
this small gain in deterrence.
5 3
The Court in Stone then held that the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habea§ corpus relief
when he has been convicted in a state court on the basis of evidence
obtained in an illegal search or seizure, contrary to the exclusionary
rule, when the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of his fourth amendment claim" in compliance with the
standards enunciated in Townsend v. Sain.55
49. Id. at 3038.
50. Id. at 3039.
51. Id. The judicial costs of the exclusionary rule were found to include the diversion
of the participants at the trial from the question of guilt or innocence: the exclusion of
reliable evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant: the "windfall" af-
forded a guilty defendant who is allowed to go unpunished as the result of a technicality;
and the resultant generation of disrespect for the law and for the administration of jus-
tice. Id. at 3050.
See, Oaks, Ethics, Morality and Professional Responisibility, 3 B.Y.U. L. RE'. 591
(1975) : Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders? 50 TEx. L. REV.
736 (1972).
52. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, argued that the reach of the exclu-
sionary rule itself should be modified, stating:
[11t now appears that the continued existence of the rule, as presently iniple-
mented, inhibits the development of rational alternatives. The reason is quite
simple: incentives for developing new procedures or remedies will remain mini-
mal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is retained in its present
form.
96 S.Ct. 3037, 3054-55 (1976).
53. Id. at 3051-52.
54. Id. at 3052. Justice Powell who wrote the opinion for the Court in Stone had earlier
expressed substantially the same view in his concurring opinion in Schneekloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) :
I would hold that federal collateral review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amend-
ment claims-claims which rarely bear on innocence-should be confined
solely to the question of whether the petitioner was provided a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts.
Id. at 250. For an analysis of Schneckloth and of Justice Powell's concurring opinion, see
Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpits Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth V. Busta-
monte, 1975 Vis. L. REV. 484 ; Note, Criminal Procedure-Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners and the Fourth Amendment, 52 N.C. L. REv. 633 (1974) ; Note, The Threatened
Future of State Prisoners' Fourth Amendment Rights Exercised Through Federal Habeas
Corpus, 9 NEw ENG. L. REV. 433 (1974).
55. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
268
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Although the Court did not expressly overrule Kaufman,5 6 it
certainly appears to have done so by implication. Kaufman was
premised on the view that the fourth amendment requires consider-
ation of search and seizure claims upon collateral review of state
bonvictions.57 The Court in Stone held that this was not a constitu-
tional requirement, but simply a "view" that was unjustified58
Justice Brennan, in dissent, asserted that the Court's holding
"portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion," 5 9 and could not be justified on constitutional grounds.60 Justice
Brennan argued that the language used in the federal habeas corpus
statute for state prisoners is explicit,', and that Congress had legis-
l.atively acquiesced in the previous interpretations of the Court con-
cerning the scope and function of habeas corpus by not amending
the statute to restrict those interpretations.
62
The Court, according to Justice Brennan, has interpreted the
availability of collateral habeas relief to be a matter of judicial dis-
cretion, contrary to the express statutory language. 63 A federal ha-
beas court apparently must now first determine whether a state pris-
oner has had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his fourth
amendment claim in the state courts before a ruling on an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus can be made. If he has had that
"full and fair opportunity," then the application must be denied.
Only if he has not had a "full and fair opportunity" can a writ
of habeas corpus be issued. Justice Brennan questioned whether
there was any real content to this "no full and fair opportunity"
exception, since the Court apparently found that the "opportunity"
given to Powell and Rice was adequate.64 According to Justice Bren-
nan, Powell "was arrested pursuant to a statute which obviously is
unconstitutional ' ' 65 and Rice's apartment was searched with a war-
rant that was "clearly deficient."6 6
56. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). For a discussion of Kaufman, see text accompanying notes
28-32 supra.
57. Id. at 225.
58. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3045 (1976).
59. Id. at 3056.
60. Id. at 3057. Justice Brennan also pointed out that the Court's decision would neces-
sarily have to be applied to federal prisoners, as well as state prisoners. Id. at 3058n.5.
61. Id. at 3056-57.
62. Id. at 3058.
63. Id. at 3062. Justice Brennan found Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to be con-
trolling precedent. Under Mapp, a state court that admits evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment has committed a constitutional error. Id. at 655. Justice Brennan
argued that it would therefore follow that the defendant has been placed "in custody in
violation of the Constitution" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas
corpus statute for state prisoners. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3059 (1976). Justice Brennan stated:
"[O]nce the Constitution was interpreted by Mapp to require exclusion of certain evidence
at trial, the Constitution became irrelevant to the manner in which that constitutional
right was to be enforced in the federal courts .... Id. at 3061.
64. Id. at 3069.
65. Justice Brennan stated that only one state judge had ever considered the validity of
the ordinance and that there was no evidence in the record to indicate why the judge in
Powell's case had rejected the defendant's claim of unconstitutional vagueness. Id.
66. Id. Justice Brennan felt that the Nebraska courts had dealt with Rice's case In a
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Justice Brennan further asserted that "to the extent federal law
is erroneously applied by the state courts, there is no authority in
this Court to deny defendants the right to have those errors rectified
by way of federal habeas. . .. "67
Justice Brennan concluded by stating:
I fear that the same treatment ultimately will be accorded
state prisoners' claims of violations of other constitutional
rights; thus the potential ramifications of this case for fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction generally are ominous. The Court, no
longer content just to restrict forthrightly the constitutional
rights of the citizenry, has embarked on a campaign to water
down even such constitutional rights as it purports to ac-
knowledge by the device of foreclosing resort to the federal
habeas remedy for their redress.
68
Justice White also dissented from the Court's opinion and offered
probably-the most reasonable solution to the application of fourth
amendment claims in collateral federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Justice White argued that the writ of habeas corpus should be as
available for fourth amendment violations as for any other consti-
tutional claim. 69 However, Justice White asserted that the reach of
the exclusionary rule should be limited. 70 He reasoned that in many
of its applications, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
not advanced at all, and thus becomes only "a senseless obstacle
to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials. ' 71 Justice White
stated:
[T]he rule should be substantially modified so as to pre-
vent its application in those many circumstances where the
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good
faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and
having reasonable grounds for this belief. These are recurring
situations; and recurringly evidence is excluded without any
realistic expectation that its exclusion will contribute in the
slightest to the purposes of the rule, even though the trial
will be seriously affected or the indictment dismissed.
72
Justice White asserted that the exclusionary rule can have no de-
manner even more violative of constitutional safeguards than that of Powell's case In the
California courts. Id. Justice Brennan found that
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the search on the alternative and patently
untenable ground that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if a defective
warrant is supplemented at a suppression hearing by facts that theoretically
could have been, but were not, presented to the issuing magistrate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 3068.
68. Id. at 3071.
69. Id.




terrent effect when law enforcement officials have acted reasonably
and with good faith, although mistakenly. 73 If the officials do their
duty, they will continue to act reasonably and in good faith, even
if they are again proven to be mistaken. 74 All that the exclusionary
rule can do under such circumstances is to impair or abort the
truth-finding process.
75
Justice White therefore seems to believe that the Court should
modify a judge-made rule before changing established statutory in-
terpretations.
By its decision in Stone v. Powell, the Court has relegated
fourth amendment claims to second class status. The Court has de-
nied collateral relief for search and seizure claims, without denying
it for other constitutional claims, although this too may eventually
happen if Justice Brennan's prognostication is correct. The only av-
enue now available for relief when fourth amendment rights have
been violated in state courts is certiorari, the grant of which is an
uncertain prospect.
The heart of the problem seems to lie with the exclusionary
rule, and not with the habeas corpus! provisions. The exclusionary
rule could be modified, in the manner suggested by Justice White,
to avoid unjust results. 76 Defendants who are obviously guilty should
not be allowed to go free, to the detriment of innocent victims and
society, due to some judicially created technicality or to mistakes
made in good faith by conscientious law enforcement officials. How-
ever, the writ of habeas corpus should not be denied to those crimi-
nal defendants who do have legitimate grievances under the fourth
amendment, particularly when the "full and fair opportunity" afford-
ed them in the state courts to litigate their fourth amendment claims
may be less than meaningful.
LAWRENCE R. KLEMIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE THAT
AUTHORIZES ASSESSMENT OF TOWING AND STORAGE FEES AGAINST
IMPOUNDED VEHICLE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR
HEARING DENIES VEHICLE OWNER DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
73. Id. at 3072-73.
74. Id. at 3073.
75. 1(l.
76. Id. at 3072. For proposed modifications of the exclusionary rule, see Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1041-55 (1974). For arguments
against modifying the reach of the exclusionary rule, see Note, The Impending Limitation
of the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule-Will the Supreme Court Vandalize the Constitu-
tion? 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 91 (1973) ; Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An
Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129
(1973).
